France should not bring the nuclear triad back
Continuously ensuring credible deterrence means conserving a more flexible and less vulnerable strike force
In the wake of rejoining NATO’s military command structure in 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy made the momentous decision to rid France of its nuclear triad, consisting of nuclear missiles that can be launched from land, air and sea. Whilst criticised at the time for his decision, Paris remains a capable nuclear power with the means of delivering nuclear warheads by sea and air. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine however, many have urged President Macron to invest in France’s nuclear deterrent and bring back the nuclear triad so cherished by previous administrations and so hard-won by President Charles de Gaulle. From a purely military point of view however, this is the wrong call. Rather, investments must be made in one branch of Paris’s nuclear deterrent in particular.
As proven throughout the Cold War, land-based nuclear missile silos can be subject to preemptive strikes by the other nuclear belligerent, inciting strikes on the homeland and weakening the victim’s capacity to retaliate. Even the most capable air-defence missile systems would have significant troubles intercepting ballistic MIRVs designed to target multiple sites at once. During the Cold War, the US understood that despite its technological advantage, surface-to-air defence systems would prove to be ineffective against new and improved Soviet MIRVs which would overwhelm any missile defence systems. With far more advanced nuclear payload delivery systems today, it is clear that intercepting these missiles would prove impossible, on top of the exorbitant costs, and would destabilise the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) or the “balance of terror,” currently the only thing keeping the Kremlin in check.
In a world where threats are more diverse and can come from various places to strike various targets, air and sea based missiles provide far more flexibility and far better deterrence. To make the most of these assets however, France must invest in one branch of its military in particular, the Navy. Submarines and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were an integral part of Cold War strategy and still preserve the strike force necessary to defend the nation’s vital interests (as outlined in France’s nuclear doctrine). Strike targets which are not immediately known by adversaries and can be stationed anywhere provide an element of surprise that land-based missiles do not. Paris still possesses a credible nuclear deterrent, as showcased by the successful M-51 Ballistic missile test in late 2023, but deterrence should always be about constantly reestablishing it. To that end, far more nuclear submarines and missiles must be developed, despite their costly nature as these can be discretely stationed in the Mediterranean and Baltic seas alongside the Atlantic Ocean to deter Russia, and the Indian and Pacific oceans to deter Iran and China. These would also take around the same amount of time as developing a brand new land-based nuclear missile force would, and probably at a lower cost. Whilst France organises its sea-based nuclear forces differently compared to the US for example, which attaches Virginia and Ohio-class attack submarines to their carrier strike groups due to its Navy’s smaller size and reach, it should accept the realities regarding the lack of aircraft carriers and coordinate nuclear submarines with polyvalent multi-mission frigates. On top of providing credible force projection, in case of an outbreak of nuclear war with Iran for example (very unlikely in France’s case), frigates could preemptively launch their own ballistic and cruise missiles to target known nuclear facilities near Isfahan, reducing the spectre of a large Iranian response before SLBMs such as the M-51 covertly stationed in the Indian Ocean deliver the fatal blow, before returning to La Réunion for regular maintenance and crew rest. In fact, the French navy it seems has already begun to take steps in that direction as proven by the joint exercise between the FREMM Aquitaine frigate and a Suffren class attack submarine that took place in early 2024 around the Bay of Biscay, with the exercise consisting of a two-stage cruise and ballistic missile launch against a precise target. Whilst one could argue that French nuclear submarines would benefit from patrolling waters with allied carrier strike groups, France has a particular attachment to its autonomy regarding the usage of nuclear weapons, ruling any such possibilities of multinational nuclear battalions out. Yet again however, such a flexible approach to sea-based nuclear deterrence demands that Paris invest more in multi-mission frigates. In fairness, the French government had placed an order for 18 of these frigates a decade and a half ago but only ended up receiving 8 of them, less than half. France hadn’t worried too much about this setback at the time as geopolitical tensions were not as heightened as they are now. But without placing new orders for these frigates, which can be made and delivered in a far more convenient timeframe than aircraft carriers, this flexibility could be hampered. Unfortunately due to technological, financial and logistical constraints, building a brand new second aircraft carrier which would be able to carry nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets will take too long to have an impact on deterring Putin who may have left the Kremlin by the time it would be complete, around 2040 (although Cold War II could still very well be in full swing by 2040). For that reason, it would not be productive to have serious conversations on investing in the Navy air force’s nuclear deterrent, despite its inherent strategic value.
The regular Air Force’s deterrent however, is also a critical component of France’s strategic forces which must not be neglected when it comes to renewing nuclear strategy in a more volatile world. Just as missile silos based in mainland France can be the subject of preemptive strikes, Air Force bases can also be the targets of preemptive attacks as aerial warfare and the current war in Ukraine have proven. Rather than falling into the trap of destabilising MAD by investing in ineffective defences and decoys, deals should instead be brokered so that Rafale jets can be stationed in allied bases across the globe while still preserving autonomy on when and where nuclear payloads can be delivered if the need were to arise. Nuclear-equipped aircraft constantly patrolling allied skies provide for better deterrence and make credible France’s nuclear doctrine of a warning strike as aircraft can be quickly mobilised (as 24h submarines can as well) to preemptively strike missile silos in Russia for example from NATO skies without even entering Russian airspace. In a world where threats are heightened, it is necessary to renew the approach to nuclear deterrence and create a far more flexible strike force. This renewal of strategy does not require a land-based leg whose defence would be ineffective, costly and would ultimately undermine the fragile concept of MAD.